Stabilizing U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts abroad

There seems to be consensus across the American political spectrum that the United States needs to create a sizable corps of civilian specialists who can stabilize and reconstruct another country--in other words, conduct "nation-building." It's said that we need such a capability because of our nation-building failures in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Current planning for a civilian nation-building capability could be its own worst enemy, with the unintended consequence of creating strong international resistance to such a role for the United States."

While the United States should clearly address the global problem of failed and fragile states, it needs to proceed carefully. If it rushes into creating a large civilian S&R capability, Washington may be "fighting the last war" as opposed to meeting the future requirement. Below, I detail what I think a civilian S&R stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) program should look like, which is different from what we're currently building.

What's in place already?

At the start of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Defense Department developed its own S&R programs under temporary authorities granted by Congress. Specifically, in 2003, Defense created a new foreign-assistance program in Iraq, the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). CERP now funds many of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams that combine military and civilian assistance in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Two years later, Defense created another security-assistance program that allowed it to train foreign security forces on a global basis; it also issued a directive that made S&R a core mission for the military. More recently, the army has developed internal doctrine for both S&R and counterinsurgency.

Some in the Pentagon want to make such activities part of its permanent mandate, but Defense Secretary Robert Gates is urging greater funding for the civilian capacity of the U.S. government to conduct S&R operations and more broadly, foreign policy. And although he's made it clear that he thinks Defense should keep programs such as CERP and security force training, his support for the civilian toolkit does reflect a desire to have a stronger civilian partner for military operations in countries that need a secure and stabile environment.

The State Department has only begun to build such a capability. Four years ago, it created an Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), which reports to the secretary of state. In 2005, a presidential directive (NSPD-44) gave this small office broad tasks--coordinating government-wide S&R operations, creating a policy matrix for such interagency responses, assembling a civilian response corps of more than 5,000 people, and deploying this capability as needed. While S/CRS doesn't have responsibility for the S&R operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, it has deployed a few individuals to countries such as Lebanon, Chad, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Liberia, Haiti, and Kosovo.

Does the United States need the proposed S&R civilian corps?

The size and missions of the proposed civilian force seem to be heavily influenced by the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet most likely, these cases are unique. In both countries, the U.S. military toppled the previous regime, causing Washington to inherit responsibility for security, governance, and economic reconstruction. It's unclear whether this kind of forced intervention will happen in the future. Frankly, the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have made a large U.S. military or civilian presence unwelcome in many countries. They have also demonstrated that Washington cannot competently deliver security, governance, or economic reconstruction.

Nor has the idea of a larger U.S. civilian capability that works with the military on S&R missions proved appealing abroad. For example, the reluctance of African countries to host the new U.S. regional command on their continent (AFRICOM) indicates the caution with which other countries view a U.S. military command that has "integrated" a civilian capability into its operations.

And it's unclear where such a large-scale U.S. military and civilian intervention is likely to take place in the future. Although some observers list Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, or Nigeria as potential candidates, Washington is unlikely to send a large military or civilian force to any of these countries given their size, geography, and the likelihood of strong internal resistance. Any other major case that might lead to such a massive intervention stretches credibility.

Therefore, current planning for a large civilian nation-building capability could be its own worst enemy. It would create an unusable and unused capacity that would encounter strong international resistance.

What kind of capability is needed?

If the United States requires such a civilian S&R capability, it's more likely to be focused on the instability, weak governance, and inept economic policies of smaller countries that can lead to disorder, civil war, and terrorism. Crafted to address these requirements, a civilian S&R capability would be much smaller, less connected to military operations, and more linked to multilateral efforts to deal with these kinds of instability. It also becomes more preventive than reactive, as the goal is to prevent social, economic, and governmental collapse before it happens.

What Washington may need then is a capability that can link up with public and private international efforts to support stability and effective governance and help create stronger economies. Interestingly, this doesn't sound like a new capability so much as a strengthening of existing U.S. foreign assistance programs by providing more personnel and funding. (See "A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future.") Within these existing programs, there's a place for a stronger niche capability to respond quickly to deteriorating circumstances, providing the base for long-term investments in governance and development.

How should the government be structured to provide this capability?

There are three main requirements to creating a strengthened U.S. capability for this mission--long-term strategic planning to identify countries that may be in trouble and to oversee U.S. interagency operations; near-term policy planning to identify and shape the U.S. response to specific crises in specific countries and regions; and the capacity to organize, administer, and deploy a small civilian capability when trouble strikes.

The problem with NSPD-44 is that it has given these responsibilities to the wrong offices, leaving civilian S&R operations without a strategy and weakening U.S. capabilities for operational implementation. NSPD-44 gave S/CRS the responsibility for strategic planning and made it the chair of an interagency planning group in the National Security Council (NSC). But S/CRS, which has worked hard on this task, is two steps down the food chain at State, an agency not known for its strategic planning capabilities. Meanwhile, the White House abdicated its leadership responsibility, leaving the S&R process without a strong interagency or White House sense of direction.

By contrast, the next administration needs to "power up" the NSC and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) with dedicated strategic planners who can set overall national security priorities and provide guidance to agencies. (See my June column, "Establishing the Next President's National Security Agenda: The Role of the White.")

Specific to the S&R mission, there needs to be an NSC directorate responsible for fragile states and post-conflict planning that works with OMB to oversee interagency strategic planning for such operations. And this directorate needs to be part of a senior directorate responsible for foreign assistance and development to ensure that S&R operations are part of broader administration long-term strategic planning. Both the senior directorate and this directorate should oversee interagency planning groups, bringing together all the players in foreign assistance and the specific agencies with responsibilities for agile response to state failures and weaknesses. When an actual operation is being planned and is underway, the NSC-OMB architecture should oversee interagency planning, resource allocation, and mission oversight.

State also has a responsibility here. It should be tasked with early warning on emerging crises and initial civilian contingency planning for regions and countries in crisis, as it has important knowledge of countries and regions and oversees a diplomatic presence that provides important information on troubled countries. S/CRS should be transformed into a planning and coordinating body for the secretary of state, focusing on early warning, providing liaison with other countries and international organizations, and working with State's own empowered regional bureaus to set the initial direction for policy, which it will bring to the NSC-level coordinating group.

As for the small capability Washington might want to provide in the field, NSPD-44 wrongly gave this responsibility to State--an institution that has no experience creating or operating such a capability--and ignored USAID, the agency which actually has this kind of experience. USAID has long-standing capabilities for responding to disasters in its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. In addition, USAID created an Office of Transition Initiatives in the 1990s to deal directly with failed governments and economic collapse on a rapid turnaround basis. And in response to the needs in Iraq and Afghanistan, USAID created an Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation to deal with emerging conflicts and an Office of Military Affairs to deal with the relationship between USAID and military operators overseas.

A tailored and focused U.S. capability for preventing and responding to state failures should build on these existing USAID capabilities, giving it responsibility for recruiting, training, managing, and deploying active, standby, or reserve capabilities. USAID would also be the field implementer of the capability, working under the authority of the ambassador and the deployed country team. State and USAID would share liaison responsibilities with international organizations and other countries providing companion capabilities. (For more on this concept, see "Twenty-First Century Peace Operations.")

The bottom line is that the problem of S&R is miscast as a U.S. responsibility to be delivered by a military/civilian partnership modeled after the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead, Washington needs a smaller, targeted capability that is able to operate without U.S. military forces and leverages U.S. skill and personnel in the context of more multilateral efforts. That capability doesn't require a new, massive bureaucratic architecture--it relies on greater interagency strategic planning at the White House, enhanced State Department policy planning, an empowered USAID, and close links to longer-term U.S. support for governance and development.