Malcolm Dando

Building a culture of responsible science

Scientists need to keep the pressure on governments to ensure the development of national norms to protect the public from the misuse of life science research.

Biological codes of conduct versus government oversight

Multiple approaches are needed to ensure that life science research is not used for malicious purposes.

Acting to educate life scientists

Talking about the need for scientists to be aware of dual-use potentials is one thing; ensuring that they are is the more important step.

The merits of a biochemical framework convention

Framework conventions are helping to guard against climate change and to protect biological diversity. Could one help prevent the misuse of the life sciences?

How to update the biological weapons treaty

Can the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention be used to educate life scientists about the potential dangers of their research? Some NGOs think so.

European biosecurity efforts fall short

In developing strategies to counter the misuse of life science research, European officials are failing to take basic realities into account.

Making the dual-use problem a "piece of cake"

Perhaps scientists need to see the life sciences' dual-use problem in more personal terms.

Raising life scientists' awareness

Would scientists be willing to participate in bioweapons programs if they were fully aware of the consequences of their work?

Missed opportunities at the chemical weapons treaty meeting

States had the chance to combat the potential of novel, "nonlethal" chemical weapons, but tragically decided to wait until next time.

Getting scientists involved in arms control

Treaties such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should find ways to involve scientists in more meaningful ways.

The Dutch experiment with a biosecurity code of conduct

The key to preventing the misuse of biological research is making scientists aware of the risks, and the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences is doing just that.

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Malcolm Dando (Profile Image)

Malcolm Dando

A biologist, Dando researches international security at the University of Bradford's Department of Peace Studies. His expertise is in chemical and biological weapons, arms control, and biosecurity. An author and contributor to countless books on bioweapons and biotechnology, including The New Biological Weapons: Threat, Proliferation, and Control (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), Dando’s recent interests include how the ongoing revolution in the life sciences might open up possibilities for new forms of biological weapons. Prior to working at the University of Bradford, Dando held a Ministry of Defence funded fellowship in operational research at the University of Sussex. Since 2002, he has travelled extensively, focusing on the in-depth national implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

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