How the Georgia conflict impacts U.S.-Russian relations

Georgia and the events surrounding it in the second week of August have marked a new and serious downturn in U.S.-Russian relations.

In the United States, there are two schools of thought about handling the issue. The majority view has tended to put most of the blame--and hence, responsibility--at Russia's doorstep. They have sought not only to get Russia out of Georgia, but also to punish and castigate Moscow along the way. This group sees Russia's presence in Georgia as merely the first step in a new and expansive Russia that's seeking to establish its dominion over at least the "near abroad" space of the former Soviet Union and perhaps beyond.

The second group is more measured and sees both sides as having committed serious errors. But it would certainly seek Russian withdrawal from Georgia and the preservation of Tbilisi's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence. Thus, it would seek to exert multilateral pressure on Russia to achieve these objectives and for the time being, to limit pressures to those necessary and useful to achieve the implementation of the cease-fire agreement brokered by the European Union (EU).

The next stage depends on two critical variables: (1) How Russia responds and particularly, to the major points of the ceasefire arrangement--cessation of shooting, withdrawal from Georgia outside the secessionist areas, return to status quo ante positions of August 6, and opening of a diplomatic conference to resolve the secessionist area issues; and (2) which of the two approaches is adopted and carried out by Washington and Europe. A third and important factor will be whether the transatlantic (EU/NATO/United States) connection will stay together and work to resolve the problem.

So far, Russia is moving slowly--if at all; the United States is talking about punishment, but acting to get the Georgia issue settled as a first priority. The EU and NATO are supporting that effort by curbing short-term interest in more excessive actions against Russia.

U.S.-Russia relations will center around Georgia and the next steps for the immediate future. Other activities will go into frozen animation for a while. How fast this phase moves ahead and how succinctly it meets its objectives on both sides will influence whether future stages will open up soon to broader activities.

Russia will delay in part to demonstrate that it can do so--that it has arrived again as a great power and is not subservient to the West's will, in part because too hasty a retreat from Georgia--where it has extensively justified its military moves at home as defense of the country and its interests-­would be seen domestically as a failure and retreat.

And this week's signing of the Polish missile defense site arrangement between Washington and Warsaw will be seen in Moscow as an attempt at rubbing salt into a wound and make Russian compliance with the Georgia deal even more difficult and strung out.

Hopefully, but we don't yet know, high-priority issues of interest to both countries will still be dealt with--loose nukes, inadvertent confrontation, and serious accidents. Let us hope even in the present difficult period that the two sides would treat such issues with respect and common concern.

The second set of questions, business as usual before Georgia, will probably be allowed to slide into a holding pattern for a while and not garner much attention. These include the 123 nuclear agreement, further trade activities around World Trade Organization membership, and the like.

A third set of approaches--designed to bring about a new, changed, and hopefully, rejuvenated U.S.-Russian relationship--will probably not be addressable until after the Georgia situation settles down. These would include working to find common interests in such areas as further nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, cooperation in dealing with Afghanistan, Iran, and elsewhere in the Middle East, practical projects to improve joint activities in everything from space to health, and so forth. The formula here would be: (1) identify common issues for cooperation to lead others to become part of the project; (2) accomplishment of specific projects or activities--agreements, etc.; (3) formally putting senior-level officials on both sides in charge of this activity in the same way that Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson has handled economic relations with China and Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin dealt with U.S.-Russian relations during the Clinton-Yeltsin period.

The latter approach might be one road out of the box that we've both found ourselves in with regard to dealing with each other over the long-term. It is certainly worth a try, but for the moment, that process cannot be opened until we see where the situation in Georgia is going. That makes it even more imperative that we deal with Georgia and Russia, working with the EU, with firmness and commitment, but not with overexaggeration and extra inflammation!